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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Funds market is a segment of the country's 
financial mechanism that has received increasingly more 
attention, as it has undergone accelerating structural 
changes. Federal Funds has'traditionally been defined as a 
money market instrument facilitating the sale of excess 
reserves, on deposit in the Federal Reserve system, from a 
commercial bank with a surplus to a commercial bank that 
needs these balances to cover a deficiency. However, the 
structural changes affecting the market is making this def- 
inition obsolete. The growing emphasis on efficient money 
management, and the increasing importance to the market of 
the participation of smaller banks, non-member banks, non- 
bank financial institutions, and other non-financial 
entities, has necessitated a more liberal defin$tion. The 
Federal Funds market can be more precisely defined as a mar- 
ket facilitating the sale of immediately available funds, 
between institutions who have the ability to transact in 
this fashion. By Federal Reserve definition, these 
entities include commercial banks, federal agencies, savings 
and loan associations, mutual savings banks, domestic 
agencies, 'branches of foreign banks, and government 
securities dealers. 1 
Historically, the Federal Funds market was initiated 
between the New York banks in the 1920's. It developed as 
an alternative to the more common methods of augmenting 
reserves: borrowing at the discount window, and exercis- 
ing call options on broker's loans. In lieu of the 
cumbersome administration attached to either of these 
alternatives, the banks determined that it would be much 
less trouble to simply swap checks. The lender would 
exchange his draft on his Federal Reserve account for the 
borrowers check payable the next day in clearing house 
funds. As a natural result of this, the brokers'realized 
that a bank with excess reserves was less likely to exer- 
cise the cal1;option on a loan than was one in need of 
reserves. Consequently, the brokers attempted to create a 
market by uniting suppliers and users of funds. 
This loose, over the counter type organization is, in 
foundation, unchanged. However, a trend in market 
participation has been occuring over the past few decades 
that has affected the market both geographically and 
institutionally. Originally, the market was predominately 
'~harles M o  Lucas, Marcos T. Jones, and Thorn B. 
Thurston, "Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements," The 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Quarterly Review 2 - 
(Summer lm7): 34. 
utilised.Qy the New York banka with little input by 
regional or country banks. This has changed considerably 
in the last twenty years. A 1970 study states that during 
the period 1965 to 1970, the banks in the 10-15 million 
dollar deposit range increased their participation rela- 
tive to other classes of banks. Even towards the end of 
thie period, however, the trend of accelerating participa- 
tion was shifting towards still smaller banks. There is 
no reason to auspect that this trend has been aborted. The 
increased yields in the money market, relative to other 
markets, the increased role of accomodating banks in 
lubricating the market mechanism and catering to the needs 
of  the smaller banke, and the increaeed efficiency of the 
Federal Reserve wire system, have all had an affect in 
eliminating the barrier8 to entry that had previously 
restricted participation in the market to the large, 
centrally located institutions. 
Intradistrict studies since this time confirm the 
perpetuation of thie trend. A 1973 study of market par- 
ticipation in the Seventh District, reports that the daily 
average net sales for emall and medium sized district banks 
I Parker B. Willio, The Federal  fund^ Market: Tts 
Qricrin and Develorrment (Boston: The Federal Res~exve Bank 
4 
increased. approximately 40% from 1970 through 1972. l A  
1973 study of S i x t h  District banks grouped a l l  member 
banks into six categories based on the extent of market 
participation. Appr~ximately 75% of the member banks fell 
into categories whose market participation conformed to that 
expected for -11 and medium sized banks. Banks catego- 
rized in the  group whose extent of participation is most 
identifiable with small and medium sized banks rose from 
52.4% in 1969 to 63.5% in 1972, with a high in 1971 of 
66.5%. Banks classified in those groups reflecting little or 
no participation in the market fell from 26.8% i n  1969 to 
8.4% in 1970.~ A 1974 study in the Eleventh District 
revealed that banks that had deposits of less than $10 
I 
million increased participation from 55% in 1970 to 80% in 
1973. For this same period, banks whose deposits ranged 
from $10 million to $50 million increased their participa- 
tion from 65% to 82%.3 These results are typical of the 
trend in market participation that is being experienced 
throughout the country. Other intradistrict studies, 
I1'~anking Developments, " The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, Business Conditions, April 1973, p. 14. 
2Arnold A. Dill, "Another Look at the Southeast's 
Fed Funds Market," The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Monthly Review 58 (August 1973) : 127. 
3~dward E. Veazey , "Market Expansion Aids Mobilization 
of Funds," The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Business 
Review, January 19 
5 
available for review, are included in the bibliography. 
The purpose of this inquiry is dichotomous in nature. 
Initially, it is desired that t h e  model being tested will 
adequately explain the variations in the Federal Funds 
rate. Secondly, it ia hoped that by testing the model in 
pre-defined time periods, the changes in market participa- 
tion that have been evidenced in the previously documented 
regional studies can be empirically identified. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
A n  attempt to investigate the elements contributing to 
changing participation in the Federal Funds Market, with 
special emphasis on the response of the rate to theee in- 
1 fluencss, was undertaken by Robert B. Platt in 1968. He 
modified a study by Goldfeld and ICane2 and constructed a 
model designed to explore three different aspects of the 
Federal Funds Market. First, he wanted to evaluate the 
importance of Federal Funds as an investment alternative in 
a bank's portfolio. second, he wanted to empirically test 
the importgnce of eight large money market institutions, 
existing at that time, in the interaction of supply and 
demand of bank reserves, the commodity being traded. 
Finally, he wanted to identify the structural changes in- 
fluencing the market during the course of his study. 3 
l~obert B. Platt, "The Interest Rate On Federal Funds: 
An Empirical Approach," The Journal of Finance 25 (June 
1970) : 585-96. 
2 ~ . ~ .  Goldfeld and Edward J. Kane, "The Determinants 
of Member Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study," The -
Journal of Finance 21 (September 1966): 499-514. 
3~latt, 'The Interest Rate On Federal Funds, " p. 585. 
7 
The work of Goldfeld and Kane explored the contribu- 
tion of certain alternative sources and uses of bank 
reserves, on the propensity that a bank would barrow 
reserves. Platt algebraically restructured the model to 
allow it to determine the relative effect of these various 
elements on the Federal Funds rate itself. This restrue- 
tured model he labeled the "reserve buffer model" because 
it was based on the change in non-borrowed reserves from 
week to week. He then further modified this model, by 
substituting actual levels of the variables for the weekly 
change in the variables. This revised model he entitled 
the "portfolio model. n l  
The basic form of the equations for these two models 
are described by the following notation: 
rf = rf (R, rd, rs, Cl), 
where, 
rf = the interest rate on FederaLFunds 
R = reserve needs, in the aggregate 
rd = the discount rate 
rs = the interest rate on ninety day 
Treasury Bills 
1 Ibid.,, p. 587. 
_~YC C1 = the level of commercial and industrial 
loans, in the aggregate 
This notation precisely describes the portfolio model. In 
the reserve buffer nwdel, the  changes in reserve needs and 
in commercial and industrial loans are substituted for the 
actual levels of these variables. 1 
The equations in this study were estimated using 
weekly data for the period 1960-1968.* The criteria that 
determined the  specific periods for the regressions was 
the relationship of the Federal Funds rate to the Bank 
Discount Rate. Historically, it was thought that borrow- 
ings from the federal fundo market, and borrowings from the 
discount window were perfect substitutes for each other. 
This would imply that the potential borrower would simply 
borrow from the source that would minimize the cost of 
r' 
borrowing. It then evolved that, due to the relative ease 
of borrowing from the Federal Funds market as compared to 
the cumbersome formality of the  discount window, and the 
ability to avoid the regulatory scrutiny inherent in the 
9 
process of borrowing from the discount window, banks were 
willing to pay a premium to borrow from the market rather 
than the discount window. The definition of Platt's time 
structure resulted from this metamorphesis. 
l~bid., pp. 586-87. 
2 
Ibid., p. 585. 
During the entire time period of his study, the 
relationship between the Federal Funds rate and the discount 
rate fell into three unique periods. In the first period, 
from 1960 through mid-1962, the Federal Funds rate remained 
well below the discount rate, perhaps as a result of non- 
participation in the market. In the second period,  from 
the middle of 1962 through the early part of 1966, the 
Federal Funds rate approached but would not exceed the 
discount rate. This apparent ceiling would indicate that 
these two sources of reserves were indeed perfect sub- 
stitutes for one another. In the final period, from early 
1966 through the end of 1968, the Federal Funds rate 
habitually exceeded i"Be &iscount rate suppurting the 
contention that ba e willing to pay a premium to 
borrow from the market. 1 
The dominant tole of the New York City Banks in the 
volume of transatations effecting the Federal Funds market 
was very graphic during the time frame of Platt's study. 
This dominance caused him to hypothesize that the reserve 
needs of the New York City Banks were a primary determinant 
of the Federal Funds RateO2 To test this hypothesis, he 
included in his equation two variables designed to dif- 
ferentiate between reserve needs of New York City Banks, 
4 Ibid., p. 588. 
and other large banks outside the New York City market 
area. The results obtained supported his hypothesis. In 
both the reserve buffer model and the portfolio model the 
coefficient f o r  the unborrowed reserves at New York City 
Banks had the hypothesized negative signs and significant 
t values, while the coefficients of the variables for banks 
outside the New York City area did not have correct signs 
in all caaee and were shown to be insignificant. 1 
During the course of his study, a trend began to evolve 
in that participation in the market had changed to include 
more large accomodating banks outside the New York City 
area, and even smaller banks who had found the Federal 
Funds market an ideal outlet for excess reserves that 
otherwise would have been left as idle cash balances on 
depoait in , the  Federal Reserve System or at an upstream 
correspondent. To attempt to empirically identify this 
trend, the time span of this study was further divided into 
a number of sub-periods allowing for comparison of the 
coefficients to identify changes in significance over the 
years. From his results he was able to conclude that the 
dominance of the New York City Banks did not change in any 
real sense, but the contribution of banks outside of New 
York City did increase relative to their contribution in 
the earkier years. 1 
The final hypothesis tested was that reserve needs and 
loan demand were important determinants of the Federal 
Funds rate during the first and third regression periods 
when the Federal Funds rate was both below and above the 
Discount Rate but were relatively unimportant during the 
third period when it was equal to the Discount Rate. To 
test this, he defined the previously described sub-periods 
based on the relationships between the Federal Funds rate 
and the Discount Rate. These three periods were labeled 
"pre-ceilingH, "ceiling", and "post-ceiling", to describe 
the prevailing relationship. The results of this test 
indicate that reserve needs as a determinant was much more 
significant during the pre-beiling period. This confirmed 
the hypothesis. Loan demand, however, was shown to be 
more significant during the ceiling period indicating r that 
as a source of reserves to support loan expansion, the 
Federal Funds market was considered more viable than the 
discount window. 2 
Tl%E RESTRUCTURED MODEL 
In attempting to accomplish the dual objectives of 
this study, as previously defined, Platt's model has been 
restructured to provide lor increased stratification in 
the supply and demand variables; to present variables 
pertaining to the rate On ninety day Treasury Bills, and 
the Discount Rate, in tenas relative to the Federal Funds 
rate; and finally, to include variables measuring the 
importance of open la6tltet activity and expectations, on the 
determination of the ~ e d a r i l  Funds rate. The revised model 
in functiqnal form is as follows: 
FFR = FFR (RPJ, RO, RS, LN, LO, TB, DR, FOMC, EX) 
where, 
FFR = weekly average Federal Funds rate 
RN = Surplus Reserves of New York City Banks 
RO = Surplus Reserves of other large banks 
RS = Surplus Reserves of small banks 
LN = Loan volume, New York C i t y  Banks 
LO = Loan volume, other large banks 
TB = Average weekly Treasury Bill rate as a percentage 
of the weekly average Federal Funds rate 
DIP= D i a c ~ f i t  gate as a percentage of the average 
weekly P?e al Funds rate 
FOMC = the holdings by the Federal Reserve banks of 
U . S .  Treaoury securities, securities of other 
govermnt  agencies, and bankers acceptances 
EX = the rate :en long term U.S. Treasury securities, 
ninety daya in the future, as a percentage of 
the current weekly average Federal Funds rate 
The variables indicating the level of surplus reserves 
are i n c l u d d  in the equation as a measure of the supply of 
Federal Funds to the market. The variable is further 
stratified to identify those reserves supplied by large 
banks in New York City, other large banks, and small banks. 
This separation is made to allow an observation of the 
coefficients over time, i n  an effort to identify the 
structural changes that have taken place in the market. 
The variables iadicating the level of loan volume are 
i 
included in the  equation as a measure of the demand for 
Federal Funds from the market. The primary purpose of the 
legal reserve limitation imposed on a bank is that it allows 
the regulatory authorities to maintain a constraint on 
\ 
credit. Since the Federal Funds market is the most readily 
accessible source for borrowed bank reserves, it is felt 
that  the level of loans will serve as a measure of the 
demand for borrowed bank reserves, which can most easily 
be satisfied by borrowing from the Federal Funds market. 
As was the case w i t h  the supply variables, the division 
of this variable into two measures representing loan 
14 
demand'zor New York City banks, and loan demand for other 
large banks, was made to allow for comparisons over time 
in an effort to identify structural changes in the market. 
The context of a portfolio approach to this inquiry 
would imply that the attractiveness of Federal Funds at any 
given time must be assessed relative to the existing 
alternative sources and uses of these surplus reserves. 
The variable reflecting the average ninety day Treasury 
Bill rate expressed as a percentage of the average weekly 
Federal Funds rate is designed to measure the attractiveness 
of the Federal Funds rate relative to an alternative 
investment vehicle, short term Treasury Bills. The vari- 
able is expressed as a ratio, relegating the individual 
movements in the two rates to a common index to allow the 
change to be measured in relative terms. The ninety day 
Treasury Bill was chosen as the most likely alternative 
investment because it is the money market instrument that 
most satisfied this need in a bank's portfolio prior to 
the advent and the increased utilization of the Federal 
Funds market. It is, therefore, considered to be the most 
likely alternative investment, over the course of this 
study, although, it is not identical in risk or maturity. 
In contrast, the Federal Reserve Discount Rate, ex- 
pressed as a percentage of the Federal Funds rate is 
designed to measure the attractiveness of the Federal Funds 
15 
market-as a source of needed reserves relative to other 
avenues of relief.  prior to the widespread acceptance of 
the Federal Funds market, the Discount Window was the 
primary alterna-tive source of reserves, consequently, the 
relationship between these two alternative costs of 
borrowing should provide a reasonable measure of the 
relative attractiveness of the market as a borrowing 
mechanism. 
Over the course of this study, the Federal Open 
Market Committee has become increasingly more active in 
its attempt to counterbalance the growing monetary 
aggregates by the buying and selling of securities in the 
open market. In March, 1970, they chose as their 
immediate objective, the control of the 'Federal Funds rate 
by allowing it to fluctuate within a predefined range. 1 
When the Federal Funds rate moved outside of these bands, 
they would move to either inject or drain reserves from 
the system, with the result being a controlled growth of 
the monetary aggregates that is consistent with*- established 
policy objectives. 
The variable that measures the holdings of securities 
by the Federal Reserve system is an attempt to measure the 
'paul Meek and Rudolf Thunberg , "Monetary Aggregates 
And Federal Reserve Open Market Operations," The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review 53 (April 1971) : 
16 
effect* of Open Market intervention in a given period. 
These holdings consist of U.S. Treasury securities, federal 
agency securities, and bankers acceptances. An increase in 
these holdings would indicate an injection of reselves 
into the system. A decrease, conversely, would indicate a 
drain of reserves from the system. 
Expectations play an important part in any portfolio 
decision. The inclusion in the model of an expectations 
variable is an attempt to measure the effects of expecta- 
tions on the portfolio decision to stay short or to extend 
maturities, which, in turn, should have ramifications on the 
Federal Funds rate, which is the most liquid, short term, 
earning a.sset in a bank's portfolio. 
< T h e  expectations variable is unique among the vari- 
ables i n  fhe model in that it is an attempt to measure an 
intangible influence in the decision making process. T h e  
most ideal measurement of t h i s  influence would be the long 
term interest rate futures which accurately measure what 
the traders believe will be the position of inwrest rates 
at a given time in the future. Unfortunately, for the 
purposes of this study, this market has not been in 
existence long enough to employ it in the model that is 
now being tested. As a proxy, the long term rate on U.S. 
Treasury securities, ninety days in the future, expressed 
as a percentage of the current Federal Funds rate will be 
used f d  measure this influence. Although i t  is the bes t  
avaliable proxy, it  is imperfect i n  that them.&@ an
inherent assumption that in all cases the expea$ations 
were correct. This ,  of course,  i s  invalid, but it is not 
considered to be fatal. 
The equation resulting from this restructured model 
can be specified as fo l lows ,  using the  notation as 
previously defined: 
FFR = A1 + BZRN + B3R0 + B4RS + B5LN + B6M3 + 
B7TB + BsDR + BgFOMC + BIOEX + e .  
The range of this study is from 1960 through 1977. 
To allow for interperiod comparisons, this time span was 
further divided into four unique periods. As one objective 
of this inquiry is to compare this modified equation to 
ther/equatbons estimated by Platt in his study, the first 
three time periods were, when possible, constructed to be 
comparable t o  the periods under comparison i n  h i s  original 
study. The periods, defined, are from January 1960 through 
July 1962; from August 1962 through June 1966; 'from July 
1966 through February 1970; and from March 1970 through 
December 1977. 
T h e  first period is identical to that used by P l a t t  
in his ~tudy. The second period was extended to July 1966 
because of a heterogeneity in the continuity of the data 
(see Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and 
limitations of the data base). The t h i r d  period was 
extended beyond December, 1968, the termination of Platt's 
study, to March, 1970. The final period begins in March, 
1970, because it was at t h i s  time that the Federa2 Open 
Market Committee began attempting to control ehe smney 
aggregates with intervention dictated by the behavior of 
the Federal Funds rate. To update this line of inquiry, 
the termination date was ehosen to be December, 1977. 
The variables quantifying the level of surplus 
reserves in the banking system are in reality Use sapply 
constraints  on the Federal Funds market. In thfe context, 
it would be expected that the signs of these variables 
would be negative, indicating that as surplus reserves 
become more abundant, the cost of these reserve8 should 
decl ine .  Inversely, since the legal reserve limitations 
rl - ,  
are imposed on the banking system as a check against 
credit, those variables quantifying the level of loan 
demand would serve as a measure of market demand for 
Federal Funds. If this relationship is true,  the signs of 
these variables should be positive, indicating that as 
loan demand increases, the demand for borrowed reserves 
will also rise, thereby increasing the cost of these 
borrowed reserves. 
I 
The variable measuring the e f f e c t s  of the relation- 
ship between the Treasury Bill rate and the Federal Funds 
rate is designed to view the Federal Funds rate as it is 
related to an alternative use of surplus reserves. It is 
19 
expected therefore, t h a t  as t h e  r a t i o  of  th9 ~ w y  Bill 
rate to the Federal Funds rate becomes inctmsiagly larger, 
surplus reserves would be replaced in a bankd@ portfulio by 
holdings of U.S. Treasury Bills and, consequently, become 
unavailable to the Federal Funds market. As t h i s  happens, 
the supply of reserves to the market would be diminished 
and t h e  cost of these funds should increase. The s i g n  of 
t h i s  variable, therefore, should be positive. 
The variable quantifying the relationship between the 
Discount Rate and the Federal Funds rate i s  Beeic~ned Do 
complement the preceeding variable in that it meaaure8 the 
Federal Funds rate relative to an alternative source of 
reserves. As the ratio of the Discount Rate to the 
Federal Funds rate becomes increasingly higher, potential 
borrowers, wishing to minimize their cost of borrowing, 
will rely on the Federal Funds market to satisfy their 
short term needs. Consequently, demand will increase and 
the cost of these reserves should rise as a result. The 
sign of this variable, therefore, will be posikive. 
The variable measuring the extent of Federal Open 
Market activity is thought to have an inverse relationship 
to the Federal Funds rate. Securities t h a t  are purchased 
by t h e  Federal Reserve are paid for by deposits into the 
broker's accounts at commercial banks. The effect of this 
is that reserves are injected into the banking system 
which increases t h e  supply of reserves and reduces t h e  
cost of%orrowing these reserves from the market. The 
sign of variable, therefore, should be negative. 
The nature of the open market mechanism utilized since 
March, 1970 may render results that are somewhat unan- 
ticipated in that by only allowing the Federal Funds rate 
to fluctuate within a narrow range, a positive policy 
action will only be initiated when the rate is expected to 
fluctuate more than is desirable. A positive action in 
the open market will, then, result in little apparent 
change in the Federal Funds rate. The results in this 
case will be significant in the first three periods 
and not significant in the fourth period, although, in 
fact, it should be most significant during this period 
given its critical role in dictating open market activity. 
I t  is questionable, therefore, that the  true effects of 
this stimulus can be identified in a regression analysis. 
The final variable, attempting to measure the effects 
of expectations on the Federal Funds rate, i s  predicted 
to have an inverse relationship. If a bank is fn a 
poeition where it is thought preferable to extend the 
average maturity of its portfolio and realize an increased 
yield on its investment, it would be desirable that this 
maneuver take place when the spread between short and long 
term interest is at a maximum, to render the fullest 
possible compensation for the sacrificed liquidity. If it 
21 
is bel-$eved, then, that long term rates in the future will 
be greater than long term rates today, relative to short 
term rates today, the probable action would be to stay 
short and wait for interest rates to reach the point of 
advantage that is anticipated. As the ratio of long term 
U.S. Treasury rates, ninety days in the future, to the 
Federal Funds rate today is increasing, then the decision 
to extend would most likely be postponed, which would serve 
to maintain the supply of reserves to the market, causing 
the rate to stabilize or decline. 
To attempt to measure the significance of the co- 
efficients estimated by the regressions, the t values of 
the coefficients, which measure the likelihood that the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable is important enough that it could 
/ 
not have been caused by chance alone, will be scrutinized 
in all cases to determine the relative importance of the 
results. This will be especially relevant in the attempt 
to empirically identify the changes in market participation, 
which will be measured by observing the t values for the 
stratified variables concerning supply and demand of 
reserves. In these cases, the expected results would 
be increasing significance in the. later years in those 
variables pertaining to banks outside of New York City. 
J%ESU&TS OF THE REGRESSION 
Initially, the four equations were estimated using 
actual weekly data. These results can be seen in Table 
3, Appendix B. The results were considered unacceptable 
due to the low Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.35, . 65 ,  .31, 
and .24  for the four equations respectively. In all cases 
this points to the exzstence of a significant amount of 
autocorrelation, and for t h i s  reason the values of the 
coefficients could not  be accepted as accurate. 
To correct the' prci#ilem of autocorrelation, the 
parameter* were recalculated using the first differences 
instead of actual data. The improved Durbin-Watson 
statistics of 2.53, 2.43, 2.26, and 2.06 demonstrate that 
the problem of autocorrelation has been successfully 
circumvented. The results of these regressions'can be 
seen in Table 1. 
The problem of autocorrelation caused a change in 
the structure of the regressions from the use of actual 
data to the use of weekly changes in the data. Since 
first differences actually measure the rate of change 
TABLE 1 
FIRST DIFFERENCES 
riable 
FOMC 
Legend : Coefficient ( T-Value ) / St. Dev. / 
in a variable e between time T and time T + 1,' the 
hypothesized signs of the variables, as wete outlined in 
the previous chapter, need to be redefined to accomodate 
this change in formulation. 
The relationship that must be considered in this 
redefinition i a  the effect of the rate of change of the 
independent variable (i.e. increasing or decreaeing) on 
the rate of change of the dependent variable, regardless 
of direction. In the interest of brevity, the cause and 
effect relationship between the variables will be outlined 
in one direction only. There is no rationale to suspect 
that the converse example would change the hypothesis. 
The first set of variables, those measuring levels of 
surplus reserves, were originally hypothesized to have a 
negative sign. As thb level of surplus reserves increase 
/ 
at an increasing rate, the Federal Funds rate should 
decrease at an increaeing rate, consequently in this new 
context, the expected sign of these variables should be 
positive rather than negative. 
The variables in the equation aggregating the level 
of loan demand were previously hypothesized to have a 
positive sign, As loans increase at an increasing rate, 
reserve needs should also increase at an increasing rate, 
'~ichael J. Brennan, Preface to Econometrics (Cin- 
cinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1973), p.  361. 
consequently, supply of reserves should be absorbed at an 
increasing rate and the cost of borrowing these reserves 
should increaoa at an increasing rate. The expected sign 
of this variab*, fms positive. 
The variakjh' . 'tbs ninety day T'reaslary B i l l  
rate to the Federal Funds sate was initially hypothesized 
to have a positive sign. As this ratio increases at an 
increasing rate, funds should move from the Federal Funds 
market to the Treasulty %Pal market at an increasing rate. 
Thia would imply that, supply of funds to the Federal 
Funds market would be re&uced at an increasing rate, 
and the cost of borrowing should increase at an increasing 
rate. The antic ipaea a&gn of the variable, then, remains 
positive. 
The ~ariable measwing the ratio of the discount 
rate to the Federal Funds rate was originally predicted 
to have a As this ratio increases at an 
increasing rate, potential borrowers will shift from the 
discount window to the Federal Funds market atlan increas- 
ing rate. Demand for  reserves would, therefore, increase 
at an increasing rate and the cost of borrowing these 
reserves would also increase at an increasing rate. The 
expected sign of this variable remains positive. 
The variable intended to measure the effects of 
Federal Reaerve open market activity was initially 
hypothesized to have a negative sign. As the holdings of 
securities by the Federal Reserve increases at an increas- 
ing rate, reserves are injected into the system at an 
increasing rate which have the effect of increasing the 
supply of funds to the market at an increasing rate and 
reducing the cost of these funds a t  an increasing rate. 
sign of this va sitive. 
, , - I  ' +----- . -. 
The expectations v q - ~ i g b  expectid 
to have a negative sign. This variable is unique among 
the variables in that the r e s u l t  of a movement in the 
independent variable is a lack of movement in the dependent 
variable. If the ratio of long term bond rates in the 
future to the current Federal Funds rate is increasing 
at an increasing rate, the funds available to market 
should decrease at a decreasing rate, consequently, the 
decrease at a decreasing rate. The sign of this variable 
is expected to be negative. 
To further test various combinations of variables in 
the regression equations, parameters were estimated for 
a number of different equations designed to satisfy the 
dual objectives of finding an equation that both adequately 
explains the fluctuations in the Federal Funds rate and 
identifies the shifte in market influences over time. 
As can be seen in the results listed in Table 1, in a 
number of cases, the signs of the coefficients were not in 
accord with the previously defined hypotheses. As it was 
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though$ that a possible ceues of  t h i o  war, the rpprccmt 
atmngth o f  the expeotatiajl. variable and it. effect  on 
the coefficients of the other variables, the equations 
were reestimated with the expectations variable omitted, 
As can be seen in Table 4, in Appendix B, this revision 
had little discernable effect on the signs of the variables. 
The next experiment was to consolidate the supply 
and demand variables into one variable representing each. 
The results of this coraputation'can be seen in Table 5, 
Appendix B, using the'following revisions i n  the 
.- C .a -4  
,.A v&tj:-;Y,[ L ,  < .-- , 
- - 
- 7 - : . ,* ,-r- 
notaticln r -.: r - :-$ :. :. . lLd:;, - 
- G$,;;? *--;.s<;d ;P 
.-p:*~p?&~p.=-< ,". .. w<i:-rr . . 
R = Surplus Rerexve8 af all reporting banks 
L Loan Volume of all reporting banks 
It appeared to make a poritive difference in regards to 
the aigns of the sum& and demand variables correspond- 
/ 
ing to terms the 
significance o f  them vsriables. The signs of the interest 
rate variables relating both the ninety day Treasury Bill 
rate and the discount rate to the Federal Funde rate did 
not correspond to the hypotheeis i n  the majority of the 
cases. The Treasury Bill variable appeared to be highly 
significant, however, the diecount rate variable did not. 
To test the importance o f  the discount rate variable 
to the model, the immediately preceding formulation was 
reestimated eliminating the discount rate. These results 
can be seen in Table 2. The most noteworthy difference 
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was t h e t  the E~ did  not f luc tua te  a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount 
i n  the reformulation, indicat ing that t h e  relationships 
between the discount rate and the Federal Funds rate did 
not make a significant contribution t o  the explanations of 
the variations in the Federal Funds r a t e .  
In these last two formulations, the consolidated 
supply and demand variables greatly aided the outcome of 
the regressions in corresponding to the hypotheses. In 
order to renew the  attempt to  empirically i d e n t i f y  the 
trends in market participation, separate supply and demand 
equations were estimated to allow these market shifts to 
be i d e n t i f i e d .  Them reauLts can be seen in Table 6 and 
7 in Appendix B. while these r e s u l t s  were not necessarily 
i n  accord with the stated hypothesis, it is felt that the 
model, as,original ly stated has been thoroughly tested, 
and any further restruaturing i s  not warranted in t h i s  
study. 
TABLE 2 
CONSOLIDATED SUPPLY AND DEMAND WITHOUT DISCOUNT VARIABLE 
Variable 60  thru 6 2  6 2  thru 6 6  6 6  thru 7 0  70  thru 77 
FOMC 
ii2 
DW 
Legend : Coefficient 
( T-Value ) 
/ St. Dev./ 
ANALYSTS AND SUMMARY 
The results obtained in the estimation of  Urese 
equations were generally consietent with the expeatations 
outlined previously and are considered satisfactory, 
however, given the revised hypotheses on which this 
study was structured, .a few of the results ware unexpected 
and require justification. The dariable reflecting the 
ratio between the Treasury Bill rate and the Federal Funds 
rate was originally hypothesized to have a coefficient 
value that was positive, supporting the contention that 
as the spread between the rate of return on these two 
instruments widens at an increasing rate, money would 
flow from the Federal Funds market to the Treasury Bill 
market at an increasing rate and have the resulting effect 
of diminishing supply to the Federal Funds market and 
cause the cost of borrowing from this market to increase 
at an increasing rate. As can be seen in Table 2, the sign 
of the coefficient of this variable was negative in all 
caees, and highly significant as was evidenced by the t 
values. No acceptable explanation can be suggested. 
It was also not expected that the ratio of the 
30 
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Treaswy Bill rate to the Federal Funde rate would be as 
significant as it is shown to be, in all four periods. 
It was originally hypothesized that for institutional 
employment, these two markets were not perfect eubstitutes, 
primarily due to differences in maturity between these 
two instruments. The high significance of the variable 
will not support this contention. It appears that the 
placement of funds is highly sensitive to the differences 
in these two rates, consequently, the spread between the 
ninety day Treasury Bill rate and the Federal Funds rate 
is a significant determinant of the supply of funds 
available to the Federal Funds market. 
The coefficients of the variable reflecting the 
effect of open market activity on the Federal Funds rate 
confirmed ,the hypotha;se in that the eignrr of the 
variable were positive as anticipated, and the variable 
was not significant in the fourth period. In the first 
and the third period, the variable was shown to be sig- 
nificant, as expected, however, in the second period it 
was not. To justify these results it must be concluded 
that although the Federal Funds rate can be effectively 
controlled by the intervention of the central bank in the 
open market, it may be that this influence, although very 
strong, can not be effectively identified in an empirical 
analysis because if the intervention is successful, the 
FederalmFunds rate will remain stable. Thus, a change 
in the independent variable will result in little change 
in the dependent variable. 
The lack of significance in the second period did 
not conform to the initial expectations. It was not 
until March, 1970 that the Federal Reserve began its 
attempt to control the monetary aggregates by monitoring 
the Federal Funds rate i n  the belief that it will effective- 
ly indicate an undeeirable change in the rate of growth. 
It can only be concluded, therefore, that s a w  aation of 
the Federal Reserve, in the second period, simulated the 
policy actions of the fourth period although the Federal 
Funds rate was not of immediate concern. This is a 
contention that warrants additional research. 
The estimates measuring the effects of the expecta- 
tions variable were surprising in that it was not expected 
that this variable would be as significant as it turned 
out to be. With the exception of the first period, the 
results confirmed the initial hypothesis that an expected 
rise in long term rates in the future would result in funds 
remaining in the Federal Funds market that otherwise might 
have been moved to a higher yielding instrument by extending 
the maturity of the investment. The limitations of this 
variable, that being the implication of perfect expectations 
may lead one to question the extraordinary significance 
reflected in the t values. 
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The e m  variables reflecting the supply and demand of 
reserves corresponded to the hypotheeis i n  all cases 
except one, that being surplue reserves i n  the third 
period. In trying to empirically identify the changes in 
market participaticln over the course of this study, the 
results of the individual supply and demand equations must 
be scrutinized. The t values of these coefficients did 
not confirm the changes in significance that  were expected. 
It was expected that the influence of the bank$ outside 
New York City would prove to be greater in the later 
years than in the earlier years. There is some aupport 
for this on the demand side, but the results of the supply 
measures appear to be oppeite to what was expected. 
There is no explanation for t h i s  that  i s  coneistent 
with the facts. . It Fk possible that while the volume of 
I' 
ac t i v i t y  has grown in absolute terms, the ac t i v i t y  in 
New York City still  d a i n a t e s  the market to such an extent 
that it overwhelms any contributions by other sectors and, 
hence, distorts the results. Another possibility is that 
due to interaction between these market stratifications, 
it is impossible to get a valid measurement that is unique 
to each class of banks. 
The effectiveness of the model in explaining the 
changes in the Federal Funds rate can best be illustrated 
by reviewing the calculated adjusted coefficient of 
determination ( E ~ )  of the equation for each period. As 
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can b=*seen in Table 2, the figures for the four periods 
were .69 ,  .94, .78 ,  and .64 respectively. It is interesting 
to compare these to those figures calculated from Platt's 
equations for his portfolio model, which are roughly 
comparable to the first three figures listed above. He 
obtained figures of .74, . 92 ,  and .78 respectively. A 
comparison of these figures would indicate that in terms 
of the ability to explain the variation in the Federal 
Funds rate, these two models are about equal. The Durbin- 
Watson's for the revised model, however, are much more 
acceptable and for this reaaon it would appear to be 
preferable. 
An interesting observation is the fall in the R~ in 
the fourth period. A possible reason for this is that the 
intervention by the central bank in the open market, which 
defies identification in the equations, might serve to 
mitigate the relative contribution of the other variables 
toward the effectiveness of the model in its ability to 
explain the fluctuation in the rate. 
The limitations of this study dicate that several 
of the observations emanating from these results must be 
left without the advantage of full exploration. The 
variable reflecting the relationship between the ninety 
'~latt, 'The Interest Rate On Federal Fund6: An 
Empirical Approach," p. 592. 
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day Treasury B i l l  rate and the Federal Funde rate laavee 
an open field for investigation. An attempt should be 
made to more precisely identify the causes of the apparent 
rigidity that waa shown to exiat in the intermarket flow 
of funds. This would necessitate an in depth investiga- 
tion into the comparability of the qualities of both 
Treasury Bills and Federal Funds as investment alternatives 
in an institution's portfolio. An analysis should then 
be made of the participants in .these markets with the 
emphasis on investment objectives and the volume of 
participation.. Finally, the effects of these considera- 
tions on the supply of funds thle various markets can 
be analyzed to i b W  lid r i g i d i t y .  
Another area that merits attention is the inability 
to empirically identify the influence of open market 
activity on the fluctuations in the Federal Funds rate. 
That the influence is indeed strong is very evident to 
any student who hae observed the market since 1970. Since 
there is no doubt that this control is real, it would seem 
that a test c\ould be structured that would be successful 
in empirically identifying it. 
Finally, the unexpected strength of the expectations 
variable in the model makes this a fertile field for 
further investigation. As was previously mentioned, this 
variable suffered from a severe limitation due to the 
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inhere.nt impl ica t ion  that i n  a l l  cases t h e  expec ta t ions  
were correct. This could not be resolved a t  the time 
t h a t  t h i s  s tudy was completed. I n  t h e  near  f u t u r e ,  
however, t h e  i n t e r e s t  rate futures market w i l l  provide 
an accu ra t e  measure of expec ta t ions  t h a t  has no r e l a t i o n  
t o  the a c t u a l  future market performance. When t h i a  market 
has been i n  ex is tence  long enough t o  provide an acceptable 
d a t a  base, t h i s  s tudy should be updated t o  see i f  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  of t h e  expec ta t ions  v a r i a b l e  remains cone i s t en t .  
As t h e  t rend  towards increased  a t t e n t i o n  t o  money 
management cont inues ,  it is  probable t h a t  t h e  entire money 
market w i l l  be dynamic i n  its f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  adapt to t h e  
needs of i t s  customer base. As t h e  Federal  Funde market 
i s  t h e  pu l se  of t h e  money market, it fol lows that as t h e  
money market cont inues  t o  broaden, t h e  elements t h a t  w i l l  
e f f e c t  t h e  Federa l  Fundca market w i l l  become more var ied  
and complex. An a c u t e  understanding of t h e  Federal  Funds 
market and those  factors t h a t  in f luence  it is  c r i t i c a l  i n  
laying t h e  foundation f o r  analyzing t h e  changes t o  come. 
This s tudy,  it is  hoped, has made a con t r ibu t ion  i n  t h a t  
d i r e c t i o n .  
APPENDIX A 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA BASE 
Prior to transforming the variables into final form, 
ten data sets were required to test the model. Due to 
the large number of observations comprising the time 
series, it was difficult, in some cases, to find consis- 
tent data that would not distort the parameters estimated 
by the regression as a result of a lack of homogeneity. 
The purpose of this appendix is to review the types of 
data collected, and explain any inconsistenciea that 
could not be avoided. 
The Federal Funds'rate was computed two different 
ways over the course of this study. Prior to the state- 
ment week ending July 25, 1973, the rate used to represent 
the actual average rate was the "effective" rate on Federal 
Funds calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Thie rate is calculated from data submitted daily by active 
money market participants. It represents the rate that was 
in effect when the majority of the transactions occured. 1 
'~oard of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, 
Statietica ,19,41-1970 (Washington D .C. : 
f ~th6 ll%k?kral Reserve System, 1976) , 
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Beginning w i t h  the etatarsent week o f  July 25, 1973 
through the met recent data available, the reported Federel 
Funds rate was a weighted average obtained by averaging 
the number ~f~transactions that were consurnmated at dif fer -  
ent  rates, and weighting these transactions by the volume 
of reserves traded, 1 
The data for the Federal Funds rate from 1965 through 
1977 was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletins 
covering the respective periods; The data prior to 1965 
was obtained from Banking and Monetary Statietior 1941- 
4 1970 .  I t  is f e l t  that  both of these methods of repre- 
-
senting the Federal F W l r  rat. are the beet available 
estimates for the period. for which they were utilized. 
Any unavoidable incon$irtanciao will be alight, and will 
have l i t t l e  discernable ef fec t  on the eetirnation of the 
regression paramatera. 
The variable used to reflect the reserve position of 
the banking system over the period o f  the study i e  the 
Igexcess reservew figure in the "Reserves and Borrowings 
of Member Banks" table reported in the monthly Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. T h i s  particular report was chosen 
because it allowed figures to be constructed which 
A Federal Reeerva Bul le t in  59 (August 1973): A33,  
bee footnote 3 ) .  
'~oard o f  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Banking and Monetary Statistics, pp. 690-92.  
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repreagnt New York City banks, other large banke, and 
small banks. 
In July 1972, the Board of Governors altered Regula- 
tion J, having to do with the  collection of checker and 
Regulation D, having to do with reserve requirements. 
Prior to this change the categories entitled "large banksN 
and "all othersH were reported as "reeerve c i t y w  and 
Ucountry88 banks. The Federal Reserve timed the change to 
occur when there was a normal seasonal expansion in re- 
serve needs. This, reinforced by the use of monetary 
policy, mitigated the effects of any exceaa reaervers 
generated by this change. At thie time, Regulrrtkon P was 
m e n d e d  to base reesrve requirements on the $is@ of  de- 
posits rather than geographic location. This neceesitated 
the previously described change in the category t i t les .  
The seriee, hawevet, ~e8aincl  continuous over tima. 1 
NO attempt was made to net out the effect8 of changes 
in the reserve requirermente. The rationale behind t h i e  is 
that a bank's excess reeerves are determined by the reserve 
requirement that is in effect a t  a given point in time. 
These excess reserves constitute the supply of Federal 
Funds available to the market. It would, therefore, be 
inconsistent to regress adjusted excess reserves against 
'"Recent Regulatory Changee in Reserve Requirements 
- 
and Check ~ollections, * ~ederal Reserve '~ulletin 58 (July 
1972) : 626-30. 
an unadjusted Federal Funds Rate. 
The data reflecting loan volume of large colmnercial 
banks was taken frcm the "Weekly Condition Report o f  
Large Commercial Banks' which is published in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. Prior to the week ending July 6, 1966, 
the report took into consideration data submitted by only 
member banks. At this time the series was revised to in- 
clude all commercial banks with deposits in exceee of $100 
million, regardless of member bank status. Continuous data, 
therefore, was unavailable over the entire period under 
study. To mitigate the effecte of the heterogenity, the 
second of the four t i m e  periods under study wae extended 
through the week ending June 29, 1966. With thio modifi- 
cation, all the figurer compiled are felt to be homogeneous 
within the period that they are regressed. Interperiod 
comparisons are st i l l  considered to be valid because 
Federal Reserve affiliation is not a condition that is being 
tested in the model. 
As different banks are added to, or deleted from the 
pool of banks aggregated in this report, inconeistencies 
may be inherent in the figures. A system has been devised 
where these figures are adjusted at year end to reflect 
these changes.' It is felt that these adjustments are not 
'~~evision of Weekly Reporting Member Bank Series, " 
Federal Reserve Bulletin 52 (August 1966): 1137-40. 
of s i g n i f i c a n t  magnitude t o  d d s t o r t  t h e  parameters 
est imated by the regression. 
The yields reported for t he  n ine ty  day Treasury B i l l  
rate were obtained frorn the monthly Federal  Reserve 
Bul l e t in s .  The yields, repor ted  are obtained from cloeing 
bid prices supplied by t h e  government secu r i t i e r ,  dealers 
t o  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These rates 
are repor ted  as a discount  rate r a t h e r  than an equiva len t  
bond y ie ld .  1 
The y i e l d s  on U.S .  Government s e c u r i t i e s  are repor ted  
f o r  a week ending on Friday.  The  Federal  Funds r a t e  and 
a l l  t h e  data emanating from aggregated bank s ta tements  
a r e  repor ted  f o r  a week ending Wednesday. These figures, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  are n o t  i d e n t i c a l l y  comparable. To mitigate 
any i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  r e s u l t i n g  from t h i s ,  the Treasury B i l l  
r a t e s  repor ted  for t h e  week ending on a given Friday were 
regressed a g a i n s t  t h e  Federal  Funds rate and s ta tement  d a t a  
repor ted for t h e  week ending t h e  fol lowing Wednesday. The 
r a t i o n a l e  behind t h i s  manipulation is  t h a t  while a compar- 
i son  based on a simultaneous market mechanism was no t  
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  it would be v a l i d  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  
previous knowledge of t h e  Treasury B i l l  rate might, i n  
i t s e l f ,  have an e f f e c t  on t h e  Federal  Funds rate. This  
'~oard of Govarnoss of the Federal Reserve System, 
Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 641. 
avoidsma situation where the Federal Funds rate would be 
regressed against a Treaeury Bill rate that had not yet  
been entirely detenained. There were no apparent incon- 
sistencies in the data over time. 
Figures for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
discount rate are reported in the monthly Federal Reserve 
Bulletins. Changes in these figures are reflected in the 
statement week during which they occured. As this is a 
declared rate, as opposed to a market rate, there are 
no inconsistencies in the data. 
To establish a measure of Federal Reserve open 
market activity, data reflecting the holdings of U.S. 
Treasury, and government agency securities, and bankers 
acceptances, by the Federal Reserve system were compiled. 
These figures were obtained from the "Consolidated 
Statement of Conditionw of the twelve federal reserve 
banks, reported in the monthly Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Since this variable is reported as a gross figure, and there 
were no announced changes in the reporting mechanism, there 
are no apparent inconsistencies in this data. 
To assess the effects of expectations in the model, 
a leading variable representing long term government bond 
rates was employed. The series used for this proxy was the 
U.S. Government long term bond series. Yields in this 
series are computed daily from closing bid prices. For 
bonde-selling at or below par, the yielda are computed 
to maturity. For bonds trading above par, the  y ie lds  
are computed t o  the f i r s t  call date. Since A p r i l  1953, 
this series includes bonds with maturities of  ten yeare 
or more, however, the number of bonds employed in the 
calculation at any given time may vary. Despite changes 
in the method of computation necessitated by time and 
movements in the market, this series is felt to be 
consistent over time. 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
ACTUAL DATA 
Variable 60 thaw 62 62 thru 66 66  thru 70 70 thru 77 
Legend: Coefficient ( T-Value ) / St. Dev./ 
TABLE 4 
FIWT DIFFERENCES WITHOUT EXPECTATIONS 
Va~iabla 60 thru 62 62  thru 66 66 thru 70 70 thru 77 
FOMC 
Legend: Coefficient ( T-Value ) / St. Dev./ 
TABLE 5 
COiNSOLZDATED SUPPLY ;j). WITH DISCOUNT VARIABLE 
Variable 60 t h y  - .- & 62 tfi-su - - 6 6 .  66 thru 70 70 thru 77 
FOMC 
Legend: Coefficient. 
( T-Value ) 
/ St. ~ e v , /  
SUPPLY SIDE 
Variable 6 0  thru 6% 62 thru 66 66  thru 70 70 thru 77 
Legend: CoefZiairat  
( T-Waaue ) 
/ St. Dsv.f 
TABLE 7 
DEMAND SIDE 
Variable 6 0 t h r u  62 62 thru 66 66  thru 70 7 0 t h r u  77 
Legend: Coefficient 
( T-Value ) 
/ St. Dev./ 
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